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INTRODUCTION
On a rainy night in 1984, while throngs of adoring Baltimore
Colts fans were fast asleep, their dreams were taken from them, the
object of their affection boxed, loaded onto Mayflower trucks, and
moved to the city of Indianapolis.' With the mobilization of this
covert caravan, Colts owner Robert Irsay made good on his threat to
* Copyright © 2009 by Will Hendrick.
1. Kimberly S. Schimmel et al., Professional Team Sport and the American City:
Urban Politics and Franchise Relocations, in SPORT IN SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 211, 231
(Alan G. Ingham & John W. Loy eds., 1993).
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leave Baltimore and, in doing so, further strained the relationship
between professional sports franchises and their host cities.2 In the
years since this relocation, the power of the franchise owner has
continued to grow. Cities now find themselves held hostage by team
owners threatening to do the unthinkable-move their beloved
franchise.' Most often, this threat is made to garner support for new
building initiatives, with owners hinting or expressly stating that,
without a new or renovated stadium, they will be forced to leave for a
more suitable venue.4 Although these threats of premature departure
cannot be characterized as anticipatory breaches of contract,5 team
owners are staring down city councils across the nation and
demanding that certain conditions be met. If these conditions are not
met, team owners make good on their threats to break the contractual
obligations that currently bind them to that location.6
The most obvious of these contractual obligations is the team's
lease agreement to play home games in its current stadium.7 For
2. The Colts were by no means the first franchise to relocate, but their move "was
something new and frightening: a team leaving its home of three decades not for lack of
support (the Colts had continued to attract large crowds in its last years in Baltimore), but
solely for the lure of greater profits." JOANNA CAGAN & NEIL DEMAUSE, FIELD OF
SCHEMES 3 (1998).
3. See Frank A. Mayer, III, Stadium Financing: Where We Are, How We Got Here,
and Where We Are Going, 12 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 195, 202-06 (2005) (noting that, as
the "power of the team owner to arbitrarily move the team to a new location has grown
over time," municipal decision makers are placed under increased pressure to meet owner
demands). For example, between 1950 and 1996, there were forty-three instances of a
major league team relocating to a new metropolitan area. See MICHAEL N. DANIELSON,
HOME TEAM: PROFESSIONAL SPORTS AND THE AMERICAN METROPOLIS 140 (1997).
4. DANIELSON, supra note 3, at 233 ("The threat to move is a key element in
bargaining over stadiums and leases, and enough teams have moved to make the threat
real."); MARK S. ROSENTRAUB, MAJOR LEAGUE LOSERS: THE REAL COST OF SPORTS
AND WHO'S PAYING FOR IT 7 (rev. ed. 1999) (exposing the tendency of a team owner
seeking public subsidies to claim "that he or she will have to leave the community, as
unpleasant and repulsive as that thought is, if a satisfactory facility is not built that has the
potential to increase revenues").
5. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Evanston v. First Nat'l Bank of Skokie, 533
N.E.2d 8, 12 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) ("In order to justify the adverse party in treating a
renunciation as an anticipatory breach of a contract[,] there must be a definite and
unequivocal manifestation of intention that the party will not render the promised
performance when the time fixed for it in the contract arrives.") (quoting Stonecipher v.
Pillatsch, 332 N.E.2d 151, 153 (11. App. Ct. 1975)). However, when threatened breach is
contingent on the independent choice of the adverse party, the manifestation of intention
to breach cannot properly be characterized as definite.
6. See CAGAN & DEMAUSE, supra note 2, at 28.
7. At one point in history, franchise owners were more likely to finance and control
ownership of the stadium. DANIELSON, supra note 3, at 223 ("Prior to the Great
Depression, big league playing facilities were private enterprises. Entrepreneurs acquired
land, built ballparks and arenas, and operated them."). But the status quo today is for the
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instance, the City of Seattle recently found itself embroiled in
litigation aimed at enforcing its contract with the local franchise of the
National Basketball Association ("NBA"), the Seattle Supersonics.'
Central to the City's case9 was a clause in the contract maintaining
that the obligations of the parties were unique and that the contract
"may be specifically enforced by either party."1  Inspired by this
contractual attempt to prohibit whimsical franchise relocation, this
Comment analyzes the viability of specific performance as a remedy
in contractual actions based on lease agreements formed between
professional sports franchises and their host cities.
To adequately express the formidability of the obstacles facing
the city of Seattle and other municipalities in such actions, Part I
addresses the traditional reluctance of courts to award specific
performance as a remedy in contract disputes. Additional
background law is provided in Part II, which highlights the areas of
jurisprudence in which the remedy is more readily available." Part
III considers specific performance as applied to lease contracts and
differentiates sports franchise leases from typical rental agreements.
Through analogy to areas of law in which specific performance is
more readily available, the remainder of this Comment is devoted to
the argument that, given the unique nature of the sports franchise
lease, a city should be entitled to relief that cannot be captured solely
through damages. In constructing this argument, Part IV focuses on
franchise to play games in a publicly owned stadium. Dennis Coates & Brad R.
Humphreys, The Stadium Gambit and Local Economic Development, 23 REGULATION 15,
16, (2000), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv23n2/coates.pdf.
However, "[i]t appears that the future trend for sports facility construction is moving to a
more private and less public support." Ralph C. Anzivino, Reorganization of the
Professional Sports Franchise, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 9, 37 (2001). Until this
pendulum swing is complete, public contracts with sports franchises remain an issue for
debate nationwide.
8. City of Seattle v. Prof'l Basketball Club, LLC, No. C07-1620MJP (W.D. Wash.
July 7, 2008), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/washington/
wawdce/2:2007cv01620/146857/143/ (ordering the case dismissed because the parties agree
to a settlement).
9. City of Seattle v. Prof'l Basketball Club, LLC, No. C07-1620RSM, 2007 WL
3217556, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 29, 2007).
10. Premises Use and Occupancy Agreement between the City of Seattle and SSI
Sports, Inc. 59 (Mar. 2, 1994) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
11. The analysis of specific performance to follow is not intended to be a thorough
treatment of the doctrine, but rather a brief overview of equitable concepts that are useful
in constructing an argument from analogy for the specific performance of lease contracts
between sports franchises and cities. For a justification of the specific performance
remedy as a whole, see generally Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89
YALE L.J. 271, 271 (1979) ("[T]he remedy of specific performance should be as routinely
available as the damages remedy.").
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the difficulty of economic valuation of the benefit conferred upon a
city by the tenancy of a sports team. After concluding that this
benefit is not captured entirely in terms of monetary rewards to a city,
Part V concentrates on the aspects of the tenancy that cannot be
replaced with a damages award, such as the provision of community
identity and the establishment of sentimental attachment, while
furthering the argument for specific performance by emphasizing the
inability of the team to cover on the market. This Comment
concludes that, in order to fulfill the goals of contract law, courts
should specifically enforce lease contracts between sports teams and
their municipal hosts.
I. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE: THE EQUITABLE EXCEPTION TO THE
RULE
Contract law in the United States exhibits a decided preference
for awarding damages rather than specific performance in actions for
breach of contract. 2 Indeed, monetary damages are the only remedy
that is always available to the victim of breach. 3 As Farnsworth
succinctly stated, "[o]ur system of contract remedies is not directed at
compulsion of promisors to prevent breach; it is aimed, instead, at
relief to promisees to redress breach."' 4  By awarding sufficient
monetary damages, the courts force the breaching party to provide a
form of substitutional relief intended to place the promisee in the
same position that he would have been in had the promise been
performed.15
12. Laclede Gas Co. v. Amoco Oil Co., 522 F.2d 33, 39-40 (8th Cir. 1975) ("It is
axiomatic that specific performance will not be ordered when the party claiming breach of
contract has an adequate remedy at law."); see also Miller v. LeSea Broadcasting, Inc., 87
F.3d 224, 230 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The normal remedy for breach of contract is an award of
damages."); USA Network v. Jones Intercable, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 488, 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
("In the contract setting, injunctive relief, both interlocutory and final, is the exception
and not the rule."). This can be contrasted with the preference for specific performance in
civil law systems. See Ronald J. Scalise Jr., Why No "Efficient Breach" in Civil Law?: A
Comparative Assessment of the Doctrine of Efficient Breach of Contract, 55 AM. J. COMP.
L. 721, 734 (2007) ("For historical reasons, specific performance in civil law jurisdictions is
not disfavored as in common law jurisdictions and, in fact, is often characterized as the
preferred remedy for breaches of contract.").
13. OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 301 (1881) ("The only universal
consequence of a legally binding promise is[] that the law makes the promisor pay
damages if the promised event does not come to pass.").
14. E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.1 (4th ed. 2004) (emphasis in
original).
15. See, e.g., Pingley v. Brunson, 252 S.E.2d 560, 561 (S.C. 1979) ("[I]f the subject
matter of a contract is such that its substantial equivalent is readily obtainable from others
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
However, the belief that damages will be sufficient to confer
upon the promisee the benefit of the bargain rests on the dual
assumptions that the benefit can be quantified and that the promisee
can secure similar performance from the open market.
16
Unfortunately, in some situations, these assumptions fail to hold true,
and the promisee cannot be made whole by an award of damages. In
recognition of the fallibility of these assumptions, the English Courts
of Equity developed the alternative remedy of specific performance. 7
Specific performance demands that the breaching party actually
perform his contractual obligations.18
For a number of reasons, courts are typically reluctant to
exercise their powers of equity in this manner. Often, even if specific
performance is warranted, courts will avoid this remedy because of
the attendant "difficulty of supervision."' 9 Specifically, the necessary
supervision may be sufficiently difficult to rule against specific
performance when oversight would be required for a long period of
time.z" This difficulty is often magnified when the court is asked to
watch over the performance of specialized contracts involving
technical knowledge or expertise, as well as those involving
"extensive and varied tasks and talents."" l Even when no expertise is
required, some courts are reluctant to award specific performance
when the contract in dispute is unusually complex and extensive
supervision would be required to assure completion of all of its
terms,22  "unless the difficulties of supervision outweigh the
importance of specific performance to the plaintiff. 23 Increasingly,
rather than defendant in an exchange for a money payment, this factor will be sufficient to
deny specific performance.").
16. Of course, if the performance expected is the payment of money, then the
sufficiency of damages will not require an appeal to market forces, as the remedy and the
performance are one and the same.
17. See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 633 (5th ed.
2003).
18. FARNSWORTH, supra note 14, at § 12.5 ("By ordering the promisor to render the
promised performance, the court attempts to produce, as nearly as is practicable, the same
effect as if the contract had been performed.").
19. Schwartz, supra note 11, at 293.
20. Risk v. Thompson, 147 N.E.2d 540, 545 (Ind. 1958).
21. Madison Plaza, Inc. v. Shapira Corp., 387 N.E.2d 483, 486 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979).
22. City Stores Co. v. Ammerman, 266 F. Supp 766, 776 (D.D.C. 1967). However,
some critics of this difficult principle argue that courts have "overdone the fear of
enforcement difficulties." DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES
§§ 2.5, 12.2 (1973) ("Most persons ordered to perform will do so, and those that do not can
certainly be subjected to equity's awesome contempt powers if that is in fact necessary.").
23. Ammerman, 266 F. Supp. at 776.
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however, the mere necessity of supervision will not prevent an award
of specific performance.
Critics also argue against specific performance because it is less
efficient than the damage remedy. They maintain that if the
presumed remedy is damages, then when the seller knows that the
buyer's losses are less than the increase in the market, he can breach,
pay damages, and capture the market increase. 4 An award of specific
performance would hinder the ability of the breaching party to take
advantage of these market factors. Another argument from an
efficiency standpoint is that specific performance increases post-
breach negotiation costs. 25  "[I]f buyers can threaten specific
performance and thereby seek to capture some of the seller's profits
from the breach, sellers will bargain hard to keep as much of the
profits as they can. "26
Still, perhaps the most powerful argument against the remedy of
specific performance is grounded in liberty and personal autonomy.
Respect for the freedom of the breaching party has led to a
presumption against specific performance in contracts for personal
services. 27 This presumption is even stronger when "the performance
of the services contracted for would be continuous over a long period
of time. ' 28  The crux of the argument is that forcing someone to
perform a personal service contract "would be but a mitigated form
of slavery, in which the party would have lost the right to dispose of
himself as a free agent, and be ... subject to the control of another.
29
Our political system prefers not to interfere in the lives of its citizenry
in such a manner as to inhibit personal liberty, so forced contract
performance is avoided whenever possible.3" Furthermore, "[s]pecific
24. For more on this theory, called "efficient breach," see Robert Birmingham,
Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV.
273, 284-86 (1970).
25. Schwartz, supra note 11, at 284-87.
26. Id. at 285-86.
27. See Pingley v. Brunson, 252 S.E.2d 560, 561 (S.C. 1979); see also Nassau Sports v.
Peters, 352 F. Supp 870, 875 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (recognizing the presumption against specific
performance of a personal services contract and distinguishing the availability of
injunctive relief to prevent violation of negative covenants therein). However, this
presumption can be rebutted "under limited circumstances" by a showing that services
have a "unique and peculiar value." Pingley, 252 S.E.2d at 561.
28. Id.
29. Ford v. Jermon, 6 Phila. 6 (Dist. Ct. 1865).
30. While founded on personal autonomy, there are other justifications for this
prohibition. For example, the difficulty of supervision and enforcement is magnified in
cases of personal service because of the inability of the courts to compel a certain quality
of performance. DOBBS, supra note 22, § 2.5 ("How do you make an opera singer sing her
best? You don't.").
2009]
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performance is particularly undesirable and impractical where it
would force essentially hostile parties into an ongoing, active business
relationship. "31
Despite all of these objections, a few areas of law have emerged
in which specific performance is more generally accepted and even
sometimes presumed. The Section below analyzes the areas of law in
which specific performance is most often awarded. This is done to
extract common characteristics of successful claims that will be
relevant to the discussion in the subsequent Part.
II. WHEN SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE IS GRANTED
Specific performance as an equitable remedy is always awarded
at the judge's discretion on a case-by-case basis,32 and, as such, it can
be difficult to distill a set of criteria by which the validity of a claim
for specific performance can be measured. Yet, while the case law
defies judicial checklists or convenient three-step inquiries, two
distinct theories in support of specific performance have proven
repeatedly persuasive.33 The first potential foundation for an award
of specific performance is the inability to accurately assess the
monetary value of the promisor's performance, as such calculation is
a logical prerequisite to awarding damages. This justification for
specific performance should be distinguished from the argument that
money of any amount would be insufficient to remedy the harm done
to the victim because of the irreplaceable nature of the good sold.34
The former is to argue that damages are impracticable, the latter that
they are inadequate.
31. USA Network v. Jones Intercable, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 488, 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
32. See Haffner v. Dobrinski, 215 U.S. 446, 450 (1910) ("[T]he doctrine is well settled
that specific performance is never demandable as a matter of absolute right, but [it is] one
which rests entirely in judicial discretion."). But cf. Laclede Gas Co. v. Amoco Oil Co.,
522 F.2d 33, 39 (8th Cir. 1975) ("[W]hen certain equitable rules have been met and the
contract is fair and plain 'specific performance goes as a matter of right.' " (citations
omitted)).
33. Other possible arguments in support of specific performance exist, such as a claim
that money damages could not be collected once awarded or that full relief would require
multiple suits for damages. See 12-63 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1142 (2005). This
Comment focuses on the two arguments for specific performance most applicable to
contractual disputes regarding sports franchise leases.





A. Impossibility of Valuation
In order to ensure that the promisee receives the full benefit of
the bargain, courts must first undertake the often difficult task of
identifying the benefit conferred. Surrendering to this difficulty,
courts have awarded specific performance where it was too
complicated to accurately assess the harm to the victim in terms of
money damages.36 Such complication might arise because of either
the ambiguity or the complexity of the terms of the contract. This
departure from the norm of awarding damages is not necessarily as
drastic as it may seem. After all, courts need not abandon their
traditional view that money serves as appropriate substitutional relief
if the only reason for not awarding damages is that there is no way of
determining what amount would be necessary.
With the increasing sophistication of economic modeling and the
commodification of countless aspects of our society, it is becoming
more difficult to imagine benefits that cannot be quantified in dollars.
Still, to assume that every benefit is quantifiable is to ignore both the
subjectivity of value and the complex nature of many contractual
agreements.
B. Inadequacy of Damages
Because the remedy of damages envisions relief through
substitution, specific performance claims are more successful when
simple replacement would prove inadequate to confer on the
promisee the benefit of the bargain. Damages are sometimes
inadequate because of the unique subjective connection between the
promisee and the goods or promises conveyed. In other instances,
the inadequacy stems from a more objective realization of the
unavailability of the goods on the market.3"
36. See DONALD HARRIS ET AL., REMEDIES IN CONTRACT & TORT 168 (William
Twining & Christopher McCrudden eds., Butterworths 2002) (1988) (noting that the more
difficult it is to assess the value of the benefit of the contract, the more willing a court will
be to grant specific performance). Traditionally, courts have characterized the inability to
calculate damages as a mere factor supporting irreparable harm determinations.
Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., 356 F.3d 1256, 1263 (10th Cir.
2004) (recognizing inability to calculate damages as a factor supporting irreparable harm
determinations); see also Autoskill Inc. v. Nat'l Educ. Support Sys., Inc., 994 F.2d 1476,
1498 (10th Cir. 1993) (upholding a finding of irreparable harm in part due to the difficulty
of calculating damages).
37. DOBBS, supra note 22, § 3.9 (explaining that damages as a legal remedy are
usually inadequate when the breach denies the non-breaching party of something the
market does not offer).
2009]
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1. Contracts for the Sale of Land
Specific performance is perhaps most commonly awarded in
contracts for the sale of land, because both types of inadequacy
counsel against a damages remedy. As one court pointed out, "[i]t is
almost a matter of course that a court of equity will enforce specific
performance of contracts concerning land, for all land is assumed to
have a peculiar value to those who contract as to it, so that damages
for breach of the contract [are] not an adequate remedy."38 Yet, the
"peculiar value" of land is not necessarily intuitive. One justification
for the fact that contracts for the sale of land are typically enforced
through specific performance could be the presumption that no two
parcels of land are physically identical.39 This focus on unique
geographical characteristics enables courts to pronounce the
unavailability of substitutional relief as a matter of objective fact.
The underlying understanding is that that the promisee could not take
a damage award and buy the same item on the open market, because
"performance cannot be duplicated by another."4 Also, "the value of
land is to some extent speculative[,]' '4 so there is a distinct possibility
of over- or under-valuation if damages are awarded.42
Rather than focus on the real nature of the land, some courts
have awarded specific performance because damage awards are seen
as an incomplete remedy due to the subjective value of the land to the
buyer.43 In this manner, courts can justify differentiation between
real estate sold for commercial purposes and that sold for residential
purposes, claiming that the loss of the former is an economic loss that
is entirely compensable in damages.'
Yet, the courts have been somewhat ambiguous in defining the
subjective "special value" of land. One possible way to characterize
this value of land is through the contribution of land ownership to
38. F.B. Norman Co. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 108 A. 743, 746 (Del. Ch.
1920).
39. DOBBS, supra note 22, § 12.2.
40. Id.
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360 cmt. e (1981). Thus, while the
inadequacy of damages to remedy the harm is the predominant claim made in support of
specific performance of contracts for land, in some instances, courts may find the value
impossible to accurately quantify for purposes of a damages award.
42. Conversely, when real estate is not unique, specific performance will not be
granted. See, e.g., Centex Homes Corp. v. Boag, 320 A.2d 194, 198 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1974) (denying specific performance in a contract for the sale of a condominium that
was "one of hundreds of virtually identical units being offered by a developer for sale to
the public").
43. See, e.g., Adderley v. Dixon, (1824) 57 Eng. Rep. 239.
44. Geneva Ltd. Partners v. Kemp, 779 F. Supp. 1237, 1241 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
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personal identity. Ever since this nation was founded, land ownership
has been fundamental in rights of civic participation.45 To own land
was thus to stake a claim to community inclusion that could not be
achieved otherwise. Accordingly, concurrent with the establishment
of equity jurisdiction was the recognition that the social consequences
of violating a promise to transfer an interest in land rendered
damages an entirely inadequate remedy.46
2. Goods of Sentimental Value
The sentimental value of goods has also been sufficient to justify
an award of specific performance.4" Unlike real property, where the
uniqueness arguably stems from the value of land qua land, a chattel
is not unique, and the promisee must argue that the particular item
contracted for sale is unique. One way to do so is to appeal to the
emotive history of a particular object. For instance, one of the
earliest cases to address sentimental uniqueness came from English
common law and involved possession of a unique horn given to the
plaintiff's "ancestors in ancient time."4 Sentimental attachment need
not, however, be based on the nature of the good itself and can
instead be proven by evidence of the complainant's involvement with
that good.49
The primary justification for specific performance in these cases
is the impossibility of compensation through monetary relief because
of the lack of fungible goods available on the market.
5  The
45. "For people of [the colonial] era, only property ownership could assure the
capacity of the voter to decide questions of community governance. Property supplied
independence; those without property were presumed to be economically dependent on
and subservient to others." Richard Briffault, The Contested Right to Vote, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 1506, 1509 (2002).
46. Centex, 320 A.2d at 196 ("[The social order of that era led to the conclusion that
damages at law could never be adequate to compensate for the breach of a contract to
transfer an interest in land.").
47. See, e.g., Burr v. Bloomsburg, 138 A. 876, 881-82 (N.J. Ch. 1927) (granting specific
performance for the sale of a ring of sentimental value).
48. Pusey v. Pusey, (1684) 23 ENG. REP. 465, 465 (Ch.). "The court awarded the
plaintiff specific performance and possession of the horn because the horn had sentimental
value for the plaintiff as a family heirloom." Burr, 138 A. at 878.
49. See, e.g., Cumbest v. Harris, 363 So.2d. 294, 297 (Miss. 1978) (noting that
sentimental value of stereo equipment could be demonstrated by the fact that the
complainant designed and built many of the components himself).
50. DOBBS, supra note 22, § 2.5 (noting that specific performance may be granted
when items are not unique but are "sufficiently unusual that money does not seem to be a
good substitute"). Here, it is important to note that the sentimental attachment artificially
undermines the presumptive fungibility of products on the open market. This should be
distinguished from instances in which market unavailability is due to an actual absence of
2009]
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fungibility of emotive items is not defined in terms of material
interchangeability, so, hypothetically, an exact physical copy of the
good could still constitute inadequate compensation." The goods are
instead unique because they have "some peculiar value above the
market value, such as heirlooms, paintings, or other works of art."52
The courts once more look to the subjective sentimentality expressed
by the victim of the breach, but these tribunals cannot simply accept
the purchaser's statement as to the value of the sale, due to the
incentive he would have to inflate the item's worth.53 There is also a
converse risk of undervaluation if the court attempts to assess the
subjective value to a reasonable person in the purchaser's position.54
To avoid this potential for over- or under-valuation, courts turn to
equity and award specific performance in these cases.
3. Goods that are Unavailable on the Market
While sentimental attachment is a sort of manufactured market
scarcity, courts have also realized the usefulness of ordering specific
performance when a good without notable sentimental value is
irreplaceable simply because of its relative unavailability on the
market.55 For example, after World War II, when new cars were
difficult to locate, a court awarded specific performance of a contract
to sell an automobile because a new car "could not be obtained
elsewhere except at considerable expense, trouble[,] or loss, which
cannot be estimated in advance."56  Damages were an inadequate
remedy because the injured party could not use the money to
purchase a replacement.
Despite the conceptual distinction between incalculability and
inadequacy, these flaws are often cited in tandem to defeat the
judicial preference for damages and require a party to specifically
perform its contractual obligation. A city resisting franchise
similar goods on the market. For a discussion of the latter justification for specific
performance, see infra Part II.b.3.
51. For example, if Bob contracted to buy a specific piano from Jane because it was
the piano his mother once played, then another piano of the same make and model could
not be delivered in satisfaction of Jane's promise.
52. Cooper v. Roland, 130 S.W. 559, 560 (Ark. 1910).
53. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 36, at 170.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Sedmak v. Charlie's Chevrolet, Inc., 622 S.W.2d 694, 700 (Mo. Ct. App.
1981); see also Harahan v. FairMarket Life Settlements Corp., No. 05-73548, 2006 WL
3103717, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2006) (stating that the Michigan Supreme Court grants
specific performance for personal property when the object is "rare[] and cannot be
obtained elsewhere").
56. Boeving v. Vandover, 218 S.W.2d 175, 178 (Mo. Ct. App. 1949).
[Vol. 87
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relocation and asking for a specific performance remedy may benefit
from a similar two-pronged argument. To successfully argue
incalculability and inadequacy, however, an analogy must be made
between the franchise lease agreement and other contractual
agreements subject to enforcement through an award of specific
performance. To complete this analogy requires an in-depth
understanding of the sports franchise lease contract.
III. OVERCOMING THE RELUCTANCE TO AWARD SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE IN LEASE CONTRACTS
On its face, the sports franchise lease contract is the conveyance
of a leasehold estate in the land.51 Much to the dismay of cities
seeking to retain their professional sports teams, the battleground of
landlord-tenant disputes is not one from which claims for specific
performance often emerge victorious. More specifically, this remedy
is very rarely awarded to a landlord for a tenant's breach of the lease
contract, with judges instead preferring to award damages. 58 This end
result is logical when one considers that the benefit of the bargain to
the landlord is typically expressed in terms of rent owed, and,
therefore, damages will be an adequate and contractually quantified
remedy. Depending on the state,59 the landlord will likely be forced
to choose between three available options. He can: (i) sue the tenant
for rent value as it becomes due; (ii) lease the premises to a substitute
57. Most courts accept the intuitive conception of a sports franchise lease contract as a
lease, without further inquiry into the property interest conveyed. See, e.g., City of Seattle
v. Professional Basketball Club, LLC, No. C07-1620RSM, 2007 WL 3217556, at *1 (W.D.
Wash. Oct. 29, 2007) (referring repeatedly to what the parties titled the "Premises Use &
Occupancy Agreement" as the "Lease"); Miller v. City of Pittsburgh, No. 02-0686, 2007
WL 1068467, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 4, 2007) (making a factual finding that "PNC Park,
including the property outside the stadium running to the curbs of the three public
roadways surrounding the stadium, is owned by the Sports and Exhibition Authority, a
public body ... [that] leases this property to the Pittsburgh Pirates"); Jeffery v. Sarasota
White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (noting that "Defendant utilizes the
baseball complex owned by the City of Sarasota pursuant to a 'Minor League Baseball
Facility Lease' "); City of Cincinnati v. Cincinnati Reds, 483 N.E.2d 1181, 1181-82 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1984) (recognizing that the city's contract with the MLB franchise was "a lease
which is admittedly binding on the Reds[]"). However, some courts prefer to characterize
the agreement as a license, because the team does not have the power to exclude the city
from possession. See Golden West Baseball Co. v. City of Anaheim, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 378,
395 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (holding, however, that this distinction is "of little importance"
and applying contract law principles to interpret the license agreement).
58. However, the prospective tenant might be able to get an award of specific
performance given the presumption of the uniqueness of land, as discussed above.
59. Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 9 (1909) ("[T]he disposition of real estate, whether by
deed, descent, or by any other mode, must be governed by the law of the State where the
land is situated." (quoting Watkins v. Holman, 41 U.S. 25, 57 (1842))).
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tenant and bring an action against the original tenant for the
differential in rent; or (iii) terminate the lease and sue immediately
for damages.6° Notably, however, if he pursues the third option, the
landlord has a duty to mitigate damages.6
The general unavailability of specific performance as a remedy in
a lease dispute is subject to some uncommon exceptions. Most
notable among these exceptions is the line of cases enforcing a
continuous operation clause in a lease contract. In these cases,
usually involving the lease of retail space in a shopping center, the
landlord includes the clause with the goal of preventing tenants,
especially those classified as "anchor tenants," from closing.62 Some
courts have even been willing to imply a continuous operation
covenant into a lease.63 When expressed in the contract, these clauses
are typically sought by the landlord because "[s]tore closings, whether
temporary or permanent, could affect several aspects of the operation
of a shopping center[,] such as the vacancy rate, tenant mix, customer
draw, profitability, or the ability to relet the space."' These clauses
have even more logical force when employed in contracts requiring
rent to be paid by tenants in the shopping center as a percentage of
earnings, because of the mutual commercial reliance of each tenant.65
Given that "it is almost impossible to calculate the effects of lost
patronage on the other tenants in the shopping center, and the
presence of a shuttered or vacant store is likely to project an image of
financial instability," courts will sometimes award specific
60. CORNELIUS J. MOYNIHAN & SHELDON F. KURTZ, MOYNIHAN'S INTRODUCTION
TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 113-15 (4th ed. 2005) (explaining landlords' remedies
for breach by tenant); see also Barraco v. Ethel Allan, Inc., No. CV 90 081801 S, 1991 WL
57084, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 17, 1991) (distilling these options into the choice
between suing the tenant who remains on the premises or evicting him and bringing suit
subject to the duty to mitigate damages).
61. Rokalor, Inc. v. Connecticut Eating Enters., Inc., 558 A.2d 265, 268 (Conn. App.
Ct. 1989) (noting, however, that the duty to mitigate damages does not exist if the landlord
elects to continue the lease).
62. Ingannamorte v. Kinds Super Mkts., Inc., 260 A.2d 841, 841 (N.J. 1970)
(upholding an express use and occupancy clause in the lease contract for a store that
occupied "about one-third of the total floor space in the [shopping] center").
63. See, e.g., Columbia E. Assocs. v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 386 S.E. 2d. 259, 262 (S.C. Ct. App.
1989) ("[T]he law will imply an agreement to do those things that according to reason and
justice should be done to carry out the purpose for which the contract was made.").
64. Patton v. Simon Prop. Group, Inc., 370 F. Supp. 2d 846, 849 (E.D. Ark. 2005).
65. Lincoln Tower Corp. v. Richters' Jewelry Co., Inc., 12 So. 2d 452, 453 (Fla. 1943)
(arguing that, "because a client or customer of any place of business in the locality was a
potential client or customer, at least, of all the others," adherence to the clause was for the
"benefit of all"); Dover Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Cushman's Sons, Inc., 164 A.2d 785, 790
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1960) (justifying injunction in a shopping center because "each
store's success [is] dependent on the continued operation of the other stores").
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performance due to the "inadequacy of damages or other legal
remedies."66
However, despite the temptation to view them as similar, sports
franchise leases are undoubtedly a different type of contract than
typical leases, because the value of the contract is not captured in the
rental amount. In order to attract franchises to their metropolitan
areas, cities often sign leases requiring the tenant to pay less than
market-value for rent.67 These franchises are typically members of
professional leagues that are able to fix the quantity of teams in the
market so as to ensure demand and foster economically beneficial
competition between cities.68 "The mismatch between supply and
demand greatly enhances the power of teams and leagues in their
dealings with places."6 9  Consequently, some cities require only a
nominal rental fee,7" and others do not require rental payments at
all.7" In fact, some cities even end up paying the franchise to remain
in the stadium, as was the case with San Diego, which promised to
subsidize the local National Football League franchise if ticket sales
did not reach a certain threshold amount.7z It is no stretch to say, as
did one court, that "[tihe City, as a corporate body, has not, will not,
66. ROBERT S. SHOSHINKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT 241
(1980).
67. Gerald A. Carlino & N. Edward Coulson, Should Cities Be Ready for Some
Football? Assessing the Social Benefits of Hosting an NFL Team, FED. RESERVE BANK OF
PHILA. BUS. REV., Second Quarter 2004, 7, at 8, available at
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/business-review/
2004/q 2/
brq204jc.pdf. The prevalence of this practice led a disgruntled voting public in Seattle to
pass an ordinance prohibiting the lease of a facility to a sports franchise for below market
value. See SEATTLE, WASH., 20 SEATrLE MUN. CODE ch. 20.47, § 1 (2006).
68. Schimmel et al., supra note 1, at 214. This artificial scarcity of supply ensures that
owners will always have a viable threat of relocation that can be, and regularly is,
employed to garner increased public subsidies, more favorable lease agreements, and,
most commonly, new stadiums. PHIL SCHAAF, SPORTS INC. 211 (2004).
69. DANIELSON, supra note 3, at 16.
70. For example, Chicago charges the White Sox franchise of Major League Baseball
one dollar in rent. Carlino & Coulson, supra note 67, at 8. The Los Angeles Rams moved
to St. Louis "in exchange for a low rent (just $250,000 a year)[] while receiving all luxury
box and concession revenues and 75 percent of advertising and naming rights fees-plus a
$46 million relocation fee." CAGAN & DEMAUSE, supra note 2, at 32-33.
71. DANIELSON, supra note 3, at 3 (noting that the Cleveland Browns relocated to
Baltimore when the owner was offered "$65 million upfront, a new stadium rent free, and
bountiful revenues from luxury seating, concessions, and advertising").
72. SCHAAF, supra note 68, at 211 (noting that, according to the terms of the
Chargers' lease with San Diego, "[i]f the team [failed] to sell sixty thousand tickets to a
game, then the city [had] to buy the difference"); ROBERT C. TRUMPBOUR, THE NEW
CATHEDRALS 43 (2007).
2009]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
[n]or was it intended to make a profit from stadium rental."73 The
dissimilarity between a sports franchise lease and the typical
commercial lease means that traditional remedies requiring rental
payments for breach of a lease contract are grossly inadequate when
attempting to compensate the city for the breach of a sports franchise
lease. Instead of rent payments, the true "benefit of the bargain" to
the city is the promise by the franchise to play its home games in the
city for the duration of its contract.74
IV. WHAT'S IT WORTH?: THE DIFFICULTY OF ECONOMIC
VALUATION OF FRANCHISE PRESENCE
Given the preference in our judicial system for a damage
remedy, logic dictates that courts adjudicating breach of sports
franchise lease contracts would be predisposed to demand that the
team ownership pay the city a damage amount equal to the value of
the promise to play.75 However, to do so would require the difficult
determination of the worth of a sports team to the city. In conducting
this inquiry, it is useful to analyze the often controversial arguments
that are offered by boosters attempting to justify the vast
expenditures on public subsidies that often go hand in hand with
franchise presence. Through this analysis, it will become clear that
the impossibility of accurate economic valuation of the tangible
benefits conferred through the presence of a sports franchise is one
reason that sports franchise lease contracts should be specifically
enforced.
73. City of N.Y. v. N.Y. Jets Football Club, Inc., 394 N.Y.S.2d 799, 803 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1977).
74. Metro. Sports Facilities Comm'n v. Minn. Twins P'ship, 638 N.W.2d 214, 225
(Minn. Ct. App. 2002). Admittedly, "[w]ide variations exist in leases among places and
from sport to sport, reflecting diff&rences among facilities in age, size, cost, and financing
arrangements, as well as when the lease was negotiated and the bargaining skills of the
contracting parties." DANIELSON, supra note 3, at 230. However, the promise to play
home games at a specific venue is an essential element of every sports franchise lease
contract and thus the central focus of the analysis in this Comment.
75. This value should be differentiated from the market value of the franchise. The
market value could hypothetically be calculated by comparing the prices paid for
franchises in that league. "The NFL, for example, sold the Cleveland Browns expansion
franchise in 1998 for $530 million; in 1999 the Washington Redskins team was sold for
$800 million; and in that same year an expansion franchise for Houston garnered $700
million for the NFL." Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposal for the Antitrust Regulation of
Professional Sports, 79 B.U. L. REV. 889, 891-92 (1999). However, what is at issue in the
lease contract is not the sale of the team but the performance thereof, so the question is




A. Increase in Taxable Spending and the Number of Taxable
Residents
The most central and frequently debated claim made by
advocates of public financial support of sports franchises is that the
presence of a sports team spurs economic growth for the city. One
prong of the argument is that event-related expenditures will boost
overall local spending. Reports commissioned by these advocates
note that fans attending sporting events generate revenue for the city
through a variety of means-spanning from ticket and souvenir
purchases to dining, transportation, and lodging expenditures.76
These direct expenditures can benefit local residents, "who then re-
spend part of this income when purchasing other local goods and
services."77 Yet, critics often respond that the money local residents
commit to financing a trip to the ballpark would be spent on other
entertainment opportunities if the sports team was not in town, so the
same multiplied benefits would accrue regardless of the presence of
the franchise.7"
In response to this criticism, much of the claimed potential for
economic growth is based on the attraction of outsiders into the
confines of the city.79 The spectacle of the sport itself can draw
people into the area, and the anticipated boost to tourism is often
part of the argument advanced for soliciting professional sports
franchises. Sports allegiances do not stop at the city borders, so many
of the "hometown fans" actually reside outside of the municipal
boundaries and will enter the city in order to support their team. 0
Given the inherent rivalry with the opponent, supporters of the
visiting team can also be expected to visit.81 Visitors to the city are
more likely to spend money on rental cars, hotel rooms, dining
76. See, e.g., WILLIAM B. BEYERS, KEYARENA ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT
tbl.15 (2006), http://www.citizensformoreimportantthings.org/KeyArena-Beyers%20
FINAL%202.21.06.htm (last visited Dec. 24, 2008).
77. Carlino & Coulson, supra note 67, at 9. The extent to which this re-spending
occurs is expressed as the "multiplier effect." Indeed, the inflation of the value of the
multiplier effect has been credited with the exaggerated economic impacts in reports from
boosters. Id.
78. TRUMPBOUR, supra note 72, at 40.
79. Mayer, supra note 3, at 212.
80. For example, thirty-six percent of the visitors to Seattle's KeyArena who come to
watch basketball games are from outside of the county in which Seattle is located.
BEYERS, supra note 76, at tbl.7.
81. One study concluded that approximately eight percent of the visitors to KeyArena
were from a state other than Washington. Id. Furthermore, factors such as the proximity
of the opponent to the host city or the existence of a "rivalry game" may increase these
numbers during individual contests.
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services, and tourist attractions than are local residents, so, by
drawing these game-day tourists into town, there is an expectation of
increased expenditure in the services sector of the city's economy.82
Broadcast contracts with the media can also lead to increased
expenditures by visitors. Although "broadcast revenues are usually
retained by the team,"83 the broadcast of the team's games is akin to
free advertising for the city. Sports events are so widely televised and
reported that "the athletic achievements of professional sports teams
often overshadow the civic accomplishments of America's great cities
in national press coverage. '  The Mayor of Charlotte, North
Carolina, Pat McCrory, in defending the addition of the city's new
professional basketball franchise, noted that, when "your score is
given on TV, it puts you in the big leagues as far as drawing attention
to your city .. "85
However, this "advertising" is not focused on luring only game-
day spectators. Indeed, boosters argue that the presence of a sports
team can attract new long-term corporate residents.86  As the
American workforce becomes increasingly mobile, cities find
themselves engaged in competition against other cities to attract
capital.87 Thus, cities endeavor, through a variety of means, to attract
new firms. Various studies conclude that the amenities offered by a
city can influence these relocation decisions by increasing the value of
the destination.88 The presence of a sports team is different from
other amenities. For example, "[t]he facilities built for sports teams
and events, because of their size and the number of people they
attract ... [,] have become defining elements or architectural
statements for many cities and regions."89 Indeed, "major sporting
events, franchises, new stadia[,] and other sport-related experiences
82. Id. at tbl.16.
83. Timothy N. Brown, Stadium Leases, in 3 THE COMMERCIAL PROPERTY LEASE
225, 231 (Patrick A. Randolph, Jr. ed., 2000).
84. TRUMPBOUR, supra note 72, at 5.
85. EVAN WEINER, THE BUSINESS & POLITICS OF SPORTS 229 (2005). It is worth
noting that the same benefit may not be received by a city that hosts a team whose name is
not attached. Examples would include Foxboro, Massachusetts, which hosts the New
England Patriots, Charlotte, North Carolina, where the Carolina Panthers play, or
Arlington, Texas, which is home to the Texas Rangers.
86. Mayer, supra note 3, at 212.
87. DAVID L. ANDREWS, SPORT-COMMERCE-CULTURE 96 (2006) ("[Clities
compete against each other to attract capital investment from corporate, governmental,
and retail sectors.").
88. Carlino & Coulson, supra note 67, at 8 ("[Pleople are willing to pay indirectly for
local amenities ... in the form of higher rents and lower wages.").
89. ROSENTRAUB, supra note 4, at 64.
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have become among the most effective vehicles for the advancement
of internally and externally identifiable places."9 Consequently, if a
city has a sports team, it is arguably more likely to attract additional
capital investment. 91 This increased investment has the consequence
of improving the city's tax base, an obvious tangible benefit.
Even if new employers are not drawn to the city, boosters argue
that the existence of a sports franchise creates jobs.. Employees are
needed to perform a litany of tasks associated with the stadium's
hosting of a sporting event, including manning parking lots, taking
tickets, operating concession stands, running scoreboards, and
providing security, just to name a few. If the projected tourism
increase materializes, local businesses in the service sector would
likely also hire workers in response to increased demand. However,
critics respond that these jobs are typically low paying and, in large
part, constitute only short term or seasonal employment.92 While
indoor stadiums can operate year-round as convention centers or
concert venues, many sports-related facilities are specifically designed
to meet the needs of a single tenant, and, as such, stadium labor is
only significant during the tenant team's season.93 These criticisms
are valid, but long-term jobs are also created when a sports team
comes to town. Sports franchises, like many other businesses, have a
need for sales, marketing, and administrative professionals. Jobs are
also created outside of the front office and include, most obviously,
those positions filled by coaches, staff, and players. "Because athlete
salaries tend to be high, even a small increase in the number of local
resident players translates into appreciable tax revenue for the city." 94
A more forceful objection to the argument that sports teams bring
90. ANDREWS, supra note 87, at 97.
91. ROSENTRAUB, supra note 4, at 151 ("Many community leaders support actions to
attract and retain teams because of the belief that the presence of professional sports
franchises persuades other firms to locate in a community" without questioning the
validity of that belief.) When corporations relocate to a city, the related relocation of their
employees to the city may also augment the municipal tax base. Obviously, not all
employees attracted to firms in the city will actually reside in the city itself, but it is safe to
assume that employees working in the city will at least contribute marginally to the
revenue stream within the city limits.
92. In Seattle, sixty-four percent of the workers employed by the Seattle Center were
seasonal employees. BEYERS, supra note 76, at fig.7.
93. Of course, a stadium may require some year-round maintenance, but the bulk of
the job creation occurs when the venue is hosting an event.
94. Indeed, "revenues associated with Sonics players living in the Seattle area" were
cited among the "large financial benefits" created by the presence of the Sonics in the
initial complaint in the litigation between the City and the team. Complaint for
Declaratory Relief at *4, City of Seattle v. Prof'l Basketball Club, LLC, 2007 WL 5262606
(W.D. Wash. Sept. 24, 2007) (No. 07-2-30997-7 SEA).
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jobs to town is made by those who point to the relative cost of job
creation through sports team presence as opposed to more traditional
means. In his testimony before Congress, Neil deMause stated
poignantly that, in light of the public subsidies that often finance
sports stadiums, while "good job-development programs can cost
about $10,000 for each new job created, sports facilities typically
come in at as much as $250,000 in public cost for each new job ....
B. Urban Renewal
Regardless of whether or not their faith is well founded, cities
often rely on the anticipated economic growth associated with sports
teams and frequently use the construction of sports stadiums as part
of concentrated efforts at urban renewal projects.96 By building
arenas in downtown areas, city planners hope to "attract large crowds
to the area to underscore its vitality, centrality, and potential for
additional economic activity and development."97 The most dramatic
example of this strategy exists in Baltimore, where the construction of
Camden Yards, home of Major League Baseball's Orioles franchise,
was undertaken as part of an attempt to revitalize the downtown area
of a city that had fallen into ruin.98 When a stadium is built, it can
thus represent a commitment by the city to urban revival of the
downtown area. This fact alone is useful in the argument for specific
performance.
As mentioned above, courts have been willing to command
specific performance of the commercial lease of an anchor tenant in a
shopping center because of that tenant's necessity to the success of
surrounding businesses and the profit of their common landlord.99
Sports teams are analogous to the anchor tenants in these shopping
centers, 100 and the city's tax collection is similar to a percentage rent
clause in a shopping center contract because the amount paid
95. Taxpayer Financed Stadiums, Convention Centers, and Hotels: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Domestic Policy of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform,
110th Cong. 2 (2007) (statement of Neil deMause), http://oversight.house.gov/documents/
20070329144749-35526.pdf.
96. Schimmel et al., supra note 1, at 233-34.
97. Matthew J. Parlow, Publicly Financed Sports Facilities: Are They Economically
Justifiable? A Case Study of the Los Angeles Staples Center, 10 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV.
483, 492 (2002).
98. ANDREWS, supra note 87, at 95-107.
99. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
100. Bruce W. Burton & Matthew J. Mitten, New Remedies for Breach of Sports
Facility Use Agreements: Time for Marketplace Realism, 88 IOWA L. REV. 809, 851-54




depends on the profits made by the business. There is an understood
expectation that the city is relying on the sports stadium to draw
consumers to the area to boost the local economy, especially when
stadium construction is undertaken as part of an urban
redevelopment project. Just as the surrounding businesses in a strip
mall would suffer tremendously from an anchor tenant "going dark,"
the local businesses developed around the stadium would suffer were
the team to relocate. As such, the city would suffer a loss of tax
revenue because of the decrease in profitability of the surrounding
businesses.
C. Opportunity Costs
Blinded by the promise of future economic development, some
cities have subsidized franchise development and ignored important
infrastructure needs. Critics of the argument that franchise presence
leads to economic growth contend that money spent on stadium
building or team retention might better be spent on more pressing
social issues.1' Thus, the valuation of a franchise must also take into
account the opportunity costs that are paid when a city decides to
invest in sports over "things like hospitals, education, raises for civil
servants, infrastructure, and social welfare programs."12 For
example, the city of Cleveland spent billions in recent years on new
stadiums for their baseball and basketball franchises only to suffer
through blackouts without a backup generator to ensure consistent
water supply to its residents.0 3
D. Is There Really an Economic Benefit?
While the aforementioned benefits are commonly associated
with sports teams by franchise advocates, there remains considerable
disagreement as to whether these benefits ever materialize. Indeed,
the difficulty of valuation of sports franchise presence is reflected in
the wide variation between economic impact studies conducted by
local boosters and academic scholars. Despite claims of objectivity,
101. Indeed, the current legislation in Seattle sparked the organization of a public
interest group, called "Citizens for More Important Things," which calls on the City to
invest in "schools, healthcare, and affordable housing." See Citizens for More Important
Things, http://www.citizensformoreimportantthings.org (last visited Dec. 24, 2008). But
see Schimmel et al., supra note 1, at 237 ("[F]unding used for franchise subsidy usually
originates from a city's capital budget, whereas public service funding originates from a
city's operational budget.").
102. SCHAAF, supra note 68, at 230.
103. WEINER, supra note 85, at 133.
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boosters are often motivated by a desire to convince the city to
support subsidies to pay for stadium construction.' As might be
expected, these studies often claim that sports teams represent a
multi-million dollar potential benefit to the city. Even assuming that
these "advocacy reports" accurately reflect revenue, the numbers that
they generate "are small compared with the existing tax revenues and
local economy."1 5 Academic reports, in contrast, claim that there is
significantly less effect on the economy of the city than the boosters
would have the voters believe. Some studies find the economic
benefits negligible, as did a study of Indianapolis, which concluded
that "there were no significant or substantial shifts in economic
development."10 6 Other reports claim that there is actually a negative
effect on the local economy.0 7 Furthermore, given the typical
longevity of a team's stay in a particular city, the residents themselves
often begin to question whether having a sports team has been a
guaranteed stimulant for the local economy.'08
The uncertainty of these residents seems warranted by the
inconclusiveness of the debate over the economic benefit of franchise
presence. As the above discussion illustrates, it is extremely difficult
to put a fair price tag on the performance required under a sports
104. TRUMPBOUR, supra note 72, at 39 ("[T]he goal is often retention or attraction of a
team, not necessarily preparation of an objective document.").
105. Coates & Humphreys, supra note 7, at 17. This article notes that, in 1999, a study
estimated that a new stadium in Baltimore would generate $3.8 million in taxes and $100
million in earnings. The authors further calculate that these figures would represent 0.7%
of the city's tax collections and 0.72% of Baltimore's total income. Id. at 16.
106. Mark S. Rosentraub et al., Sport and Downtown Development Strategy: If You
Build It, Will Jobs Come?, 16 J. URB. AFF. 221,236 (1994). A 1994 study by Robert Baade
examined forty-eight American cities over thirty years and concluded that "professional
sports teams generally have no significant impact on a metropolitan economy." Robert A.
Baade, Stadiums, Professional Sports, and Economic Development: Assessing the Reality,
HEARTLAND INSTITUTE POLICY STUDY No. 62, at 19 (1994), available at
http://www.cppa.utah.edu/Perspectives/v2i7-Baadeforpub.pdf.
107. See, e.g., KEVIN J. DELANEY & RICK ECKSTEIN, PUBLIC DOLLARS, PRIVATE
STADIUMS 30 (2003) ("[I]n seven of the nine cities they examined, the city's share of
regional income actually declined after adding a team or a new stadium."); Coates &
Humphreys, supra note 7, at 19 ("The presence of professional sports teams, on average,
reduces the level of real per capita income in metropolitan areas.").
108. See DELANEY & ECKSTEIN, supra note 107, at 27 (noting that the public is
growing skeptical of the correlation between the presence of stadiums and economic
growth). In a remarkable irony, during the recent litigation between the City of Seattle
and the Supersonics, the team's lawyers argued that "there will be no net economic loss if
the Sonics leave Seattle." Jim Brunner, Sonics: City Wouldn't Miss Us, SEATTLE TIMES,
Jan. 18, 2008, at B1, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.comlhtml/sonics/
2004131860_sonicsl8m.html.
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franchise lease contract. Drawing on precedent, specific performance
could be awarded based on this fact alone. 109 However, to the extent
that specific performance is an appropriate remedy, it is not
necessarily important if the economic benefit conferred on the city is
great or negligible.
V. WHAT'S IT TO You?: THE NONPECUNIARY BENEFIT OF THE
BARGAIN
Under the legal framework outlined above, the more compelling
argument is that damages of any amount would be inadequate
because they would prove incapable of placing the city in a similar
position as if the promised performance had been given. What is
more important under this theory is the extent to which economic
benefits are (or are not) the only benefits that cities reap from lease
contracts with professional sports teams. Putting the difficulty of
quantifying the benefits aside, if purely economic benefits captured
the entire benefit of the bargain, the court would render a just
remedy by simply enforcing a damage remedy."' The amount of the
remedy, although likely a pittance in comparison with the cost of
stadium construction, for instance, would place the city in the same
situation as if the team had performed. However, the primary
benefits that a city enjoys as a result of the presence of major league
franchises are not economic in nature. Indeed, "[m]ost of the true
benefits sought by the municipality in a leasing arrangement with a
major league professional team are intangible, but highly valued,
psychological factors.. 11
A. Social Identity
The presence of a sports team serves an important social function
for members of a city through the provision of social identity.
Psychologists note that, especially in an urban environment, which
fosters less focus on the individual, people gravitate toward sports
teams because fan allegiance provides them with a sense of
community belonging and group identity." 2 Sport spectatorship can
transcend ethnic, religious, and social boundaries, thus providing a
unique opportunity for group cohesion and fostering community
109. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
110. If the city made a bad deal (i.e., paid more for a stadium than it could recoup in
ticket sales and concessions), it would not be rescued by the court, unless the contract was
deemed unconscionable.
111. Burton & Mitten, supra note 100, at 818.
112. ARNOLD BEISSER, THE MADNESS IN SPORTS 117-21 (1977).
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acceptance in ways that other group membership may not. This
group cohesion can have valuable personal and interpersonal effects,
because "the presence of a highly salient group identity produces ...
enhanced individual feelings of self-esteem in reference to group
membership, or collective self-esteem.'
1 3
Defining individual identity necessitates distinguishing others."4
Inasmuch as sport facilitates such introspection and self-actualization,
it also enables group members to differentiate themselves from
members of other groups." 5 When a team associates with a city, the
fans bind together and begin to acknowledge and romanticize the
differences between other cities and their own."'6 "For millions in the
urban setting[,] the local ball team (usually a professional team) is an
important, if not the predominant, basis for identification with the
city.""'  The resulting relative community pride is bolstered by the
inter-city competition that is inherent in professional sports leagues.
Even the style of play of the sports team can resonate within the
community identity, such as when Pittsburgh fans rally around the
hard-nosed smash-mouth run game of the Steelers because it
represents the blue-collar mentality of the city." 8
Sport is also valuable as a means of image projection. "It is
commonly believed that hosting a professional sport franchise
enhances a community's prestige.""' 9 This particular power of sport
has historically had effects at both the national and international
levels. Scholars and political scientists have recognized the value of
sports allegiance in the nationalistic sense, even to the point of noting
that sport is "one of the most influential activities involved in the
production of a modern national identity."'2 ° Sport can be used to
113. Audrey J. Murrell & Beth Dietz, Fan Support of Sports Teams: The Effect of a
Common Group Identity, 14 J. SPORT EXERCISE AND PSYCHOL. 28, 29 (1992).
114. JOSEPH MAGUIRE ET AL., SPORT WORLDS: A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 143
(2002) ("Human beings seem to feel a need to display togetherness as well as difference
and distinction.").
115. Id. at 137-41.
116. Michael Winerip, It's Not Just a Game: The City-Suburban Tensions of an Ohio
County, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1996, at 22, available at http://query.nytimes.com/
gst/fullpage.html?res=9F02E7D61139F934A25750COA960958260.
117. Emil Bend, Some Functions of Competitive Team Sports in American Society
(1970) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh) (on file with Davis
Library, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill).
118. Jere Longman, Pittsburgh: A Big Happy Company Town, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12,
2005, at Dl.
119. Schimmel et al., supra note 1, at 222. "Having a team is widely seen as the mark
of being a big league city, [while] losing one is perceived as a serious blow to a place's
status." DANIELSON, supra note 3, at 102.
120. S.W. POPE, PATRIOTIC GAMES 4 (1997).
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project national superiority, 12  as was evident when Americans
swelled with national pride after the 1980 Olympic men's hockey
team was victorious over their Soviet opponents. 122  The joy
surrounding this victory on the ice resulted from not only athletic
success, but also from a deeper social understanding that, because of
the representative value of sport, the win represented a victory of
democracy over communism. 123  In this regard, it can be said that
"[s]port and specifically sportspeople can serve as national
representatives not just for sport but also for ideology and
identity., 124 However, sports teams need not win on the international
stage to dramatically represent the national identity. Nations can
benefit merely from participation, such as when the countries of
Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina were able to
participate in the 1992 Summer Olympics as newly independent
countries, thus affirming their independence to the world.1 25 Nor is it
necessary that the team represent an entire nation to confer similar
identity benefits. The very same qualities of sport that draw together
a national community and allow a team to speak for the populace are
present in local sports as well.
If cities are seen as engaged in a battle for capital, the extent to
which sport can play a role should not be underestimated. By
developing a strong civic identity and pride among its populace,
sports can help a city to retain its workforce.2 If sport is used
effectively as a tool for image projection, it could also be used to
attract outsiders to the community who are drawn by this athletic
advertising.127  Local growth coalitions and politicians alike have
121. This use of sports as an assertion of dominance has been misused as well, with the
most notable case occurring in the propaganda-laden presentation of the Summer
Olympics in 1936, which Hitler used to advance the Nazi cause. See BARRY D.
MCPHERSON, JAMES E. CURTIS & JOHN W. LOY, THE SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF SPORT
105 (1989) ("Hitler hosted the 1936 Nazi Olympics to demonstrate the superiority of the
German race.").
122. Serge Schmemann, Drama and Scandal Make the Olympics, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19,
2002, at D3 ("Back in 1980, it was the huge overlay of ideology and national pride-and
not the quality of play-that made the American hockey victory over the Soviet team a
Miracle on Ice.").
123. Id.
124. MAGUIRE ET AL., supra note 114, at 70.
125. See Michael Janofsky, Games Begin With a Shot of Catalonian Spirit, N.Y. TIMES,
July 26, 1992, at L1. Formerly, these countries had been part of Yugoslavia. Id.
126. There are undoubtedly additional, more persuasive forces that influence the
mobility of the workforce, but the argument here is that community identity fostered
through sports allegiance can play a role in the decision-making process of an individual
considering relocation.
127. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
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realized this potential use of sports, and a focus on the intangible
benefits has become more central in their efforts to attract and retain
sports teams.
2 8
In summary, the identity benefits conferred upon the city by a
franchise presence are twofold. First, to the extent that the city is
concerned with the cohesion and social well-being of its inhabitants,
the effects of spectatorship on the individual become relevant.
Perhaps more compelling is the way in which sports come to define
and represent the collective community both internally and
externally. Because of these "identity contributions," sports teams
offer a unique and special value to the city, in much the same way
that land does to the real estate purchaser.
B. Sentimental Attachment
Given the centrality of sports franchises to the collective identity
and pride of a city, it can be inferred that the city's populace develops
a strong sentimental attachment to the team. Damages would be an
inadequate remedy in cases of breach of sports franchise leases
because the value of sentimental attachment is highly speculative.'29
But, proving sentimental attachment can be a difficult task. By
definition, "sentimental" means "[r]esulting from or colored by
emotion rather than reason or realism."' 3 ° Some items are inherently
sentimental, such as wedding rings and family heirlooms,' so, in
some sense, sentimentality can be argued through general social
understanding of the emotion attached. The emotion generated by
spectator sports should therefore not be underestimated.
Sentimental attachment can also be developed through historical
interaction with an item or place, such as when a person has a
sentimental attachment to a cottage because it was the setting for past
experiences with family.'32 Generations of families grow up going to
the ballpark and rooting for their hometown team. The history of a
sports team is intertwined with the history of its fans, and these
allegiances can last long after that team leaves for greener pastures.
128. See DELANEY & ECKSTEIN, supra note 107, at 22 ("Justifications emphasizing
community self-esteem and community collective conscience became more popular in the
late 1990s and into the twenty-first century.").
129. See Carpel v. Saget Studios, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 1331, 1333 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (stating
that the sentimental value of wedding pictures was "so highly speculative that it is not a
proper element of damages for consideration by the jury").
130. AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1264 (4th ed. 2007).
131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360 cmt. b (1981).
132. See Phillips v. Ryan, No. CV-91-123, 1993 Me. Super. LEXIS 293, at *1-2 (Me.
Super. Nov. 12, 1993).
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The uniforms, mascots, team colors, and most importantly, the name
of a particular franchise come to mean something to the city that
cannot be easily replaced. In recognition of the value of this aspect of
community history, the city of Cleveland, which was the victim of an
NFL franchise relocation, negotiated for the retention of the
trademark, colors, and team records of the Browns franchise in a
settlement with the team owner.'33
Because of the inherently emotional nature of sentimental
attachment, aside from evidence of a person's assertions of
attachment, it is difficult to show true emotional connection.' Such
attachment can arguably be demonstrated by irrational actions taken
with regard to an object, as when someone rushes into a burning
house to rescue family photo albums. In this respect, the exorbitant
public subsidies that are often paid by taxpayers to support a local
sports team might be further evidence of a sentimental attachment."3
C. Inability to Cover on the Market Undermines Damage Remedy
The damage remedy proves inadequate not only because of the
inability of money to capture the value of the franchise to the city, but
also because of the inability of money to replace the value lost. It
would be practically impossible for a city to use a damage remedy to
secure a sufficient substitute on the open market. Even setting aside
the fact that goods to which there is a sentimental attachment are not
materially interchangeable, the city seeking a substitute team would
133. See Don Nottingham, Keeping the Home Team at Home: Antitrust and Trademark
Law as Weapons in the Fight Against Professional Sports Franchise Relocation, 75 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1065, 1072 n.33 (2004). In contrast, despite efforts by the City of Seattle to
negotiate for rights to the logo, name, colors, and memorabilia associated with the Sonics,
the terms of the settlement reached between the City and Sonics owner Clay Bennett
allow Bennett to retain ownership of those rights. The Professional Basketball Club, LLC
and City of Seattle Settlement Agreement Memorandum of Understanding 3 (July 2,
2008) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter Settlement Agreement
Memorandum] (outlining the agreement between the Professional Basketball Club, LLC
and the City of Seattle); see also Percy Allen, A Tale of Two Cities Sharing One History-
"Shared History" Details Still Being Worked Out; Bennett Owns the Title Trophy,
SEATTLE TIMES, July 6, 2008, at D1, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.comI
html/sonics/2008035532_soni06.html (noting, however, that Bennett has agreed to return
ownership of these rights to the City if Seattle establishes another NBA franchise).
134. It might be only slightly easier to disprove assertions of sentimental attachment,
such as by showing a person's prior attempt to convey the land to which they claim
attachment. See In re Estate of Olson, 2008 SD 4, 69, 744 N.W.2d 555, 577.
135. However, the counterargument could be made that these subsidies are made to
retain sports in general, not necessarily to retain the specific sports team in question.
Without an analysis of voter motivation and in light of the aforementioned economic
irrationality of these subsidies, the claim that these subsidies evidence sentimental
attachment is not unfair.
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be left with the unenviable options of luring an existing franchise to
the city or appealing to the professional leagues to allow an expansion
franchise to be located in the city. In considering the viability of these
options, it is important to highlight the motivations and practices of
the professional sports leagues, as they would constitute the "market"
in which the city would seek a replacement.
Each of the professional sports leagues was first formed as a
profit maximizing cooperative.136 The fact that sports leagues thrive
off of the manufactured scarcity of their product is especially relevant
to the availability of an expansion team.137 Because there is only a
limited amount of wealth and talent available in the sports business,138
each league has established procedures by which expansion teams can
be created. Typically, the decision to expand the league is made by
the league office and is only possible if a "super-majority of the
existing clubs" agree to expansion. 39 Oftentimes, in order to be
granted a new franchise, an additional fee must be paid. 14' League
expansion was more common in the past, but the rarity of expansion
teams in today's sports leagues speaks to the formidability of the
obstacles blocking that option. For example, the NBA has only
conducted nine expansion drafts in league history, and only four
teams have entered the league since 1989.141 Similarly, "since the
NFL and AFL merged in 1966, the NFL has added only seven
additional teams, even though several markets desire franchises. 142
The other option for the city left behind by a relocating franchise
would be to entice an already existing franchise to fill the void. This
136. See ROSENTRAUB, supra note 4, at 78 ("The four [major] sports leagues were
originally formed to ensure competition and to attract other investors who might be
willing to assume the risks associated with team ownership.").
137. See id. at 96 ("As long as the supply of teams is less than the number of cities that
want one, owners can bargain for the best possible deals from different communities.").
138. Schimmel et al., supra note 1, at 222 (noting that league members are resistant to
expansion "because increasing the number of franchises in the league dilutes both the
capital gain of existing franchises and the player talent pool").
139. ROSENTRAUB, supra note 4, at 79.
140. See Schimmel et al., supra note 1, at 222 ("When a league decides to expand, its
members determine the location of expansion and the price the new team must pay to be
included in the league.").
141. See THE OFFICIAL NBA ENCYCLOPEDIA 75 (Jan Hubbard ed., 3d ed. 2000).
Further indicating the market saturation and/or reluctance of the league to expand in
America is the fact that the Charlotte Bobcats are the only American franchise admitted
to the league since 1989. See Significant Dates in Basketball History,
http://www.prosportstransactions.com/basketball/Dates.php (last visited Dec. 24, 2008).
142. Daniel Rascher & Heather Rascher, NBA Expansion and Relocation: A Viability




too would likely prove difficult, though certain factors would work in
the city's favor. Most notably, "[i]n franchise relocation decisions the
courts have ruled that individual sports teams act as individual
competitors rather than as a unified organization." '143 Thus, cities at
least benefit from the ability to focus their persuasive efforts on
singular owners rather than seek approval from the entire group of
owners. Furthermore, "due to the uncertain enforceability of [league
restrictions on relocation] and the lack of resolve by the leagues to
seek to enforce them, the sports franchises have been able to relocate
at their discretion."" However, teams typically relocate because they
anticipate a more attractive financial situation in a new market, either
through sheer size of the new territory or through "sweetheart
stadium deals." '145 The fact that a city already lost its franchise tends
to show that it was unable to compete with other cities attempting to
116draw its team away. It can therefore be confidently assumed that
the city would have difficulty wooing a new franchise, especially given
the fact that any potential suitor would stand to incur additional costs
associated with breaching its current lease. In light of the underlying
dispute that resulted in damages, the city would also suffer from its
perception as litigious and unwilling to bend to the will of ownership.
For these reasons, only rarely does a city replace a sports team with a
member of the same league as the departed. 47 NBA Commissioner
David Stern affirmed this trend in recent statements he made prior to
the conclusion of the litigation between the City of Seattle and the
Sonics. Commenting on the likelihood of the NBA's return to Seattle
if the Sonics left, Stern said "[i]f the team moves, there's not going to
be another team there, not in any conceivable future plan that I could
envision. '
143. TRUMPBOUR, supra note 72, at 46; see L.A. Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l
Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1387-90 (9th Cir. 1984).
144. Anzivino, supra note 7, at 40.
145. See DANIELSON, supra note 3, at 137-39 ("Teams move primarily to improve the
bottom line; they seek more customers, higher revenues, lower costs, and better deals in
new locations.").
146. Id. at 134-35 ("Today, relocation is how almost all places lose teams.").
147. In the NFL, for example, it took Baltimore more than two decades to replace the
Colts, despite multiple attempts to entice other franchises.
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The history of the four major sports leagues149 all but precludes a
third option, which would be to replace the team with one from a
different league. Replacement of this sort could take one of three
forms. One option would be for the city to put a minor league
affiliate of the same league in place of the departing franchise. While
some of the aforementioned resistance would still exist, it would not
be as strong to the proposition of attracting a minor league
franchise. 150 Assuming the local market has not shrunk dramatically,
the city losing a major sports franchise would likely be capable of
supporting a minor league team. Thus, the league at least would
stand to benefit economically from the establishment of a minor
league franchise, the likes of which are usually located in smaller
markets in a large city. However, a minor league team would not be a
satisfactory replacement for the city, because the benefits of a minor
league franchise are significantly lower. Economically, they are
lessened, because minor league teams tend to sell fewer tickets,
generate less local business, and draw fewer fans from out of town. 5'
In terms of identity benefits, minor league teams are viewed by the
public as second-tier replacements, because league affiliation is often
used as a metaphor for the status of a community. 5 2 The quality of
the athletic performance and the prestige of the minor league
franchise is lower, thus projecting the image of a city that is relatively
inferior to its "major league" counterparts.153 For example, the
growth coalition in Cincinnati campaigned vigorously for public
subsidies to support the Reds and Bengals franchises around the
slogan "Keep Cincinnati a Major League City."' 5 4 Voters supported
the subsidy in some instances because they did not want their city to
149. The major sports leagues are Major League Baseball ("MLB"), the National
Football League ("NFL"), the National Basketball Association, and the National Hockey
League ("NHL"). These leagues represent each of the four biggest sports in the country:
baseball, football, basketball, and hockey. See CAGAN & DEMAUSE, supra note 2, at 28.
150. Consider, for example, the case of baseball, in which "[f]ranchise relocation of
minor league teams is more prevalent." Jeffrey Gordon, Baseball's Antitrust Exemption
and Franchise Relocation: Can a Team Move?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1201, 1214 (1999).
151. ARTHUR T. JOHNSON, MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL AND LOCAL ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 7 (1993).
152. See id. For example, when rallying support for a new hockey team in Raleigh,
North Carolina, one booster remarked that it would take "a unified effort if Raleigh is to
move out of the minor leagues." DANIELSON, supra note 3, at 103. Perhaps more
importantly, fans are not "likely to consider minor leagues as comparable to the four
major professional sports leagues." Piraino, Jr., supra note 75, at 896.
153. DANIELSON, supra note 3, at 103 ("Not having major league teams marks a place
as minor league.").
154. DELANEY & ECKSTEIN, supra note 107, at 54.
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become another Dayton or Louisville, nearby cities with only minor
league franchises.'
An equally disagreeable option for the city would be to replace
the team with another playing the same sport in a different league.
The same arguments that militate against the viability of a minor
league franchise as a viable replacement hold true here as well.
Revenues, caliber of play, and community identity benefits are all
significantly lower in leagues other than the NFL, NBA, MLB, and
NHL. The second-tier status of leagues in competition with the Big
Four has been the result of conscious efforts on the part of the major
leagues to "retard the development of competing leagues.
1 56
Another way for a city to circumvent the league of which the
breaching franchise was a member would be to attract a new major
league team that played a different sport. This option depends on the
fungibility of the game played. Generally, sports preference is
somewhat regionalized.'57 Also, the existing facilities would likely be
inadequate, and unless the current stadium was built with this dual-
sport design in mind, the city would incur significant costs in
converting its current stadium to facilitate other sports.
158 Still, the
greatest barrier to this approach would be that "[t]he courts have
recognized that from a consumer's perspective, the type of sport
produced by a particular league is not reasonably interchangeable
with other sports or other forms of entertainment.'
59
CONCLUSION
Despite the shortfalls of the damage remedy, courts rarely grant
specific performance of sports franchise lease contracts.
16 ° Perhaps
155. Id. at 55-56.
156. RoSENTRAUB, supra note 4, at 73.
157. Hockey is more popular in the North than in other regions of the United States,
for example.
158. The dimensions of the playing surface alone often keep stadiums used for one
sport from being used to support teams from other athletic endeavors. For instance, only
three NFL teams (the Minnesota Vikings, Miami Dolphins, and Oakland Raiders) share
their stadiums with members of the other three major leagues, and in each instance, the
co-tenant is a baseball team (the Minnesota Twins, Florida Marlins, and Oakland A's).
159. Piraino, Jr., supra note 75, at 895; see also NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85,
111 (1984) (affirming the factual finding of the trial court that "intercollegiate football
telecasts generate an audience uniquely attractive to advertisers and that competitors are
unable to offer programming that can attract a similar audience").
160. For some notable exceptions, see generally Metro. Sports Facilities Comm'n v.
Minn. Twins P'ship, 638 N.W.2d 214 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (granting a temporary
injunction preventing the Minnesota Twins from breaching its agreement with the
Metropolitan Sports Facilities Commission for the use of the Metrodome); City of N.Y. v.
N.Y. Jets Football Club, Inc., 394 N.Y.S.2d 799 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1977) (requiring, in part, that
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the resistance can be explained by the classic argument that
enforcement would cause substantial harm to the other party. Teams
sometimes justify their relocation by saying that it would cost them
considerably to stay."'I But, this does not explain the permission of
teams to breach contracts simply so they can add to already lucrative
profit margins. It should also be noted that, although contractual
performance would ultimately require the athletic performance of the
team's players, the lease agreement is not a contract for personal
services. The players themselves are bound to the franchise owner,
not the city, and any loss of autonomy they experience is a result of
their individually negotiated contracts with the franchise, not due to
the name of the city on their uniforms.
Courts might also be reluctant to undertake the supervision
required to enforce these contracts. However, the complexity of a
lease pales in comparison to the countless intricately detailed
contracts that have been enforced in the past. The primary
supervisory difficulties would concern the ability of the court to force
the teams to play the games in a particular city. As such, the bulk of
the required supervision could be accomplished by tuning into a local
sports broadcast. 62 Ironically, what might truly keep the courts from
granting specific performance is the fact that they are reluctant to
become fans of the game. Furthermore, the considerable damage to
the city if performance is not guaranteed should weigh heavily into
the courts' consideration and make them more amenable to
conducting the necessary supervision.
In the months preceding the publication of this Comment, the
sports world waited anxiously to see if a federal judge in Seattle,
Washington, would grant specific performance despite the traditional
objections discussed above. The viability of this remedy was squarely
before the court, 3 and an earlier court decision had prevented the
team from retreating behind the protective cover of arbitration."6
the Jets abide by its contract with the City and only conduct home football games at Shea
Stadium).
161. See News Release, Seattle Sonics & Storm, Statement of Chairman Clayton I.
Bennett (Nov. 2, 2007) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (indicating
relocation was prompted, in part, by the denial of public funds, and the lack of sufficient
private funds, to construct a new arena).
162. The lease contract, of course, may contain provisions dealing with revenue sharing
and game-day responsibilities that would be more difficult to supervise, but these
provisions are usually not the source of the litigation.
163. See supra note 8.
164. Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Stay and Granting Plaintiffs Cross-Motion
for Stay of Arbitration, City of Seattle v. Prof'l Basketball Club, LLC, No. C07-1620RSM
(W.D. Wash. Oct. 29, 2007).
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Intent on going to trial, the City had already rejected a $26 million
settlement offer.165 A six-day trial commenced, because the City was
convinced it was "in as good a position as a city can be to hold a
sports tenant to a lease. ' '166 Fans across the nation shifted to the edge
of their bleacher seats, expecting a pronouncement from the bench
that would clarify the power of the city to enforce a lease contract.
Instead, the parties settled the case out of court, leaving
settlement of the legal issue for another team and another city. After
the trial, and apparently because he "thought there was a chance that
he would be forced to stay in Seattle,, 167 Clay Bennett, the owner of
the SuperSonics, increased his settlement offer to $45 million. The
difference between the final settlement amount and the initial offer
lends credence to the assertion that precise economic valuation of the
worth of franchise presence is an extremely difficult undertaking.
Although Bennett retained the rights to the team name, history,
memorabilia, colors, and intellectual property, he agreed to relinquish
those rights should a new franchise arise in Seattle. 16 This settlement
provision underscores the importance of social identify benefits and
the sentimental attachment that the city felt to its franchise. An
additional $30 million was promised if Seattle is unable to secure a
new NBA franchise despite stadium renovation. The inclusion of this
conditional increase indicates that the parties clearly considered the
possibility that comparable goods would be unavailable on the
market.
If uncertainty as to the outcome of litigation, is a common reason
for parties to settle out of court, the resolution of the Seattle case
should come as no surprise. Despite the traditional reluctance of
courts to award specific performance, a number of arguments can be
formed which counsel for an award of specific performance in
contractual disputes arising out of sports franchise lease agreements.
As this Comment has demonstrated, in certain instances the damage
remedy does not accomplish contract law's goal of placing the
promisee in a similar position as if the promise had been performed.
The unique nature of sports franchise lease contracts makes them
similar to those areas of law in which specific performance has
165. Lester Munson, Q&A On the Sonics Move to Oklahoma City, ESPN, July 3, 2008,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?page=080702munsononsonicsmoveQA (last
visited Dec. 12, 2008).
166. Jim Brunner, Can Lease Keep Sonics Here?, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 27, 2007, at
B1, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/20038
5 5006 _sonicslease
27m.html (quoting Tom Carr, the lead attorney in the case for the City of Seattle).
167. Munson, supra note 165.
168. Settlement Agreement Memorandum, supra note 133.
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developed favor in our court system. First, the ill-defined and hotly
contested economic benefits conferred through these contracts
demonstrate the near impossibility of accurate valuation. In order to
provide just compensation to the city, courts would be faced with the
difficult, if not impossible, task of assessing the monetary benefit of
franchise presence. More importantly, courts also allow specific
performance when money alone could not make the injured party
whole. The nature of sport in American society suggests that the
damage remedy could not redress the injury, due to the sentimental
attachment developed to a city's team and the unique provision of
social identity that spectatorship offers. Even were these allegiances
transferable, ultimately, the structure of the sports market would
preclude the provision of a replacement. Thus, in a reverse of the
traditional athletic roles, until judges step to the plate and come to
bat for the cities of America, it will continue to be the ones sitting on
the bench who ultimately determine what happens on the field of
play.
WILL HENDRICK
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